Overview

The crisis in Seoul in August, which saw the ousting of Unification Minister Lim Dong-won seems to have led to a breakthrough in North-South relations. Lim, who was seen as the architect and symbol of President Kind Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ came under attack in the National Assembly over Southern participation in a Liberation Day festival in Pyongyang. Lim had authorised the attendance by 311 South Koreans. ’During the trip’ as the Seoul paper Korea Herald put it, ‘ some delegates allegedly expressed sympathy toward the North, with seven of them being arrested after their return, creating a conservative backlash in the South.’ The incident is a reminder of the strength of anti-rapprochement forces in the South, as well as the fragility of political rights.

However, there was a happy outcome in that Pyongyang abruptly reversed its previous policy of freezing high-level contacts with the Seoul in order to pressure Washington to resume negotiations where they had been left by Clinton. Apparently concerned by what was happening in Seoul, and perhaps influenced by Jiang Zemin’s imminent visit the following day, Pyongyang proposed resumption of talks on 2 September. Seoul immediately agreed and the 5^th Ministerial Talks took place 15-18 September in Seoul.

DPRK delegate Kim Ryong-song took the offensive by saying on his arrival at Inchon airport that North Korea "felt sorry about the terrorist attacks, which were a catastrophe to the United States and shocked the entire world." Rim declined to sign a joint ‘anti-terrorist’ declaration saying that this was beyond the scope of these inter-Korean talks. The talks themselves seem to have been very successful, with a string of firm outcomes. In particular a fourth round of family reunions, and working level talks on the crucial land route to Mt Kumgang, the reopening of rail and road links, the Russian gas pipeline to the south, joint fishing and navigations rights and the development of the Kaesong industrial complex. However, Kim Jong Il’s return visit to the South is still up in the air; the Northern side said it would go ahead ‘at the appropriate time’.

It is unclear how the terrorist attacks on the United States will affect US-DPRK relations. On the one hand it might incline the US government to turn away from imaginary threats in order to concentrate on real ones. As Selig Harrison points out, the brouhaha about North Korean missiles is primarily an device to justify the missile defence programme; a concern echoed by Senate Foreign Relations chairman Joe Biden. On the other hand a growth in confrontationism, xenophobia and war hysteria in the United States (where there is even talk of using tactical nuclear weapons) could lead to a worsening of relations. The DPRK is clearly concerned about this and there is a South Korean report of a `private communication' by Pyongyang to the US State Department saying that it that it regretted the attacks and didn't have anything to do with them’.

It was encouraging that Secretary Powell took the opportunity of a meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Han Seung-soo on 19 September to reiterate ‘that we are prepared to engage with the North Koreans again at any time and place that they wish to engage without any preconditions and with both sides bringing whatever agenda items to the table they wish to.’ However, Pyongyang sees the US introduction of a call for the reduction of DPRK conventional forces as ‘unilateralist and hostile’ and violating the ground rules established with the Clinton administration. DPRK conventional forces pose no credible threat to the US, and Pyongyang is probably right to see the issue as a ploy to derail the negotiation process. It is to be hoped that a chastened Washington will quietly drop this, that a concerned Pyongyang will similarly downplay calls for an early US withdrawal from Korea and that both sides will move quickly to an agreed agenda that will allow for dialogue, the alleviation of DPRK food and energy crisis, and progress towards normalisation of relations.

Tim Beal

Joint Communique of 5th North-South Ministerial Talks

The 5th north-south ministerial talks were held in Seoul from September 15 to 18, Juche 90 (2001).

Confirming the mutual will to implement the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration to the letter and agreeing to make positive efforts to ensure the sustainable development of the north-south relations and peace, both sides have agreed on the following points at the talks:

1. In order to promote the national reconciliation and unity the north and the south shall develop dialogue and cooperation between the authorities of the two sides and, at the same time, actively support contacts, visits and cooperation at a non-governmental level on the basis of mutual interests and respect.

2. The north and the south have shared the understanding that it is necessary to take a humanitarian measure to alleviate the sufferings of separated families and relatives on the occasion of the autumn festival this year and, for this, agreed to exchange the 4th visiting groups of separated families and relatives from October 16 to 18.

3. The north and the south shall take the following measures for the balanced development of the national economy and the escalated economic cooperation.

1) In order to reconnect the Sinuiju-Seoul railways and the Kaesong-Munsan Motorway with the Kaesong industrial zone on a preferential basis, the north and the south shall start soon the linking project depending upon an agreement on the military guarantee to be signed and effectuated between the two sides and open them to traffic as early as possible.

2) Having agreed to step up the work of setting up the Kaesong Industrial Zone, the north and the south decided to hold working-level contacts at an early date to this end and commence the project after confirming the scale of the zone and its detailed action program.

3) The north and the south agreed to positively push ahead with measures to pep up Mt. Kumgang tourism, and for this shall hold authorities-to-authorities talks on October 4 and discuss and settle issues related to pepping up the tourism including tourism by way of land transportation.

4) The north and the south agreed to positively cooperate with each other to put the project of linking the two parts of Korea-Russia railways into practice and examine the work of linking gas pipeline.

5) The north and the south agreed to hold working-level contacts between maritime transport officials at an early date in order to discuss the issue of permitting peaceful cargo ships to pass through other side's territorial waters.

6) The north and the south agreed to start field survey within November as soon as necessary measures are taken by the military authorities of the two sides within the framework already discussed between them on the issue of preventing flood damage in areas along the River Rimjin.

7) The north and the south agreed to make four agreements take effect as early as possible after going through necessary procedures, the agreements which include the agreement on the protection of investment, the agreement on the protection of double taxation, the agreement on the procedures for the settlement of business disputes and the agreement on the settlement of accounts, all aimed to provide legal and institutional mechanism for inter-Korean economic cooperation already signed and exchanged between the north and the south.

8) The north and the south agreed to hold contacts between working-level officials concerned at an early date in order to discuss the issue of jointly using part of the fishing ground in the east sea of the north side.

9) The north and the south shall discuss specific measures to implement the above-said practical economic issues at meetings of the committee for the promotion of economic cooperation and other institutions concerned and hold the second meeting of the committee for the promotion of economic cooperation from October 23 to 26.

4. On the basis of the decision to exchange Taekwon-do exhibition teams, the north and the south agreed to send the north side's team to the south side in October and the south side's team to the north side in November and discuss related working issues between officials concerned.

5. The north and the south decided to hold the 6th north-south ministerial talks from October 28 to 31, Juche 90 (2001).

Seoul September 18, 2001

Source: KCNA(North)/Korea Information Service(South)

NO MILITARY BUILD-UP IN N. KOREA

Associated Press reported that the ROK Defense Ministry said in a report to the parliament on Monday that the DPRK has imported US$340 million of military equipment in the past decade. Half of the spending took place in the last two years, possibly reflecting a slight improvement in the DPRK's economic situation. ROK defense officials said the DPRK was not engaged in a big arms buildup. ROK Lieutenant Colonel Chang Sung-hyun said, "The imports concentrate on military equipment rather than weapons, and it seems to us they are increasing the imports simply to change their outdated equipment." ../... Last year, the DPRK spent US$100 million on aircraft parts and tank engines and batteries. In 1999, it bought MiG-21 fighter planes and helicopters from Kazakstan and Russia. ../.. the DPRK has also bought explosives, artillery pieces and trucks.

Source: The Associated Press Seoul, 9/10/01 via Nautilus

KCNA on U.S. call for "resumption of dialogue with DPRK"

Officials of the Bush administration are building up public opinion in a bid to create impression that the U.S. is deeply interested in the resumption of dialogue with the DPRK, saying that the U.S. "has willingness to resume unconditional dialogue with the DPRK." ../.. The U.S. has not yet withdrawn those agenda items for negotiations it had unilaterally put up before both sides sit together although it is calling for the resumption of unconditional negotiations.

Those agenda items are unacceptable as they are unilateral and hostile in their nature. Even the demand for the reduction of the DPRK's conventional weapons for self-defence is included there. It is quite clear that the dialogue can hardly be resumed unless those agenda items are withdrawn. ../.. the dialogue can be resumed only when the present U.S. government drops its anachronistic way of thinking in the era of the cold war and at least takes a stand identical to that of the Clinton administration in its last period.

During the Clinton administration the DPRK and the U.S. published the Geneva DPRK-U.S. agreed framework and the New York DPRK-U.S. joint communiqué in which they agreed to remove the source of long-standing mistrust, confrontation and misunderstanding and normalize the bilateral relations. And both sides, accordingly, promised each other to fulfil political, moral and legal obligations to terminate hostile relations, build confidence and clear the other side of its worries.

The DPRK has so far remained faithful to the agreed framework by honestly keeping its promises made to the U.S. to freeze its nuclear program and suspend its missile launch. ../..

The U.S. should clarify in principle its stand that it will not undermine the basic foundation built up with so much effort through previous bilateral talks. This will be a touchstone judging whether the U.S. has willingness for dialogue or not. ../..

Source: KCNA, Pyongyang, 23 August 2001

EXPERTS: US HAS RARE OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE N.KOREA,"

Experts at a two-day conference on "North Korea in the World Economy" that ended Tuesday [28 August] argued that the US should do more to restart talks with the DPRK. Former US Ambassador to the ROK Donald Gregg said that this was an "extraordinary juncture in Northeast Asia" because of the shared regional concern over developments in the DPRK. He stated, "I think that there is an opportunity such as I have never seen in Northeast Asia to pull that region together in an era of cooperation. The United States must be willing to stand in the mainstream of history as a player." He argued that the US President George W. Bush administration should separate its DPRK policy from its interest in pursuing a national missile defense (NMD). He also suggested dropping the term "rogue state" and ending the practice of lumping the DPRK in with Iraq. Gregg stated, "I think the case (for NMD) can be made on its own merits apart from hanging pejorative labels on North Korea that no other country in the region will subscribe to." Leon Sigal, author of "Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea," called on the US to soften its rhetoric toward the DPRK. Sigal argued, "To say you don't trust Kim Jong-il is asking for trouble." Currently the administration points to the threat from countries like North Korea, Iraq and Iran, which it calls rogue states, as justifications for a missile defense. Deputy Director-General of the first Asian department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Georgi Toloraya said that he believed the DPRK had changed more in the past two years than it had over the past half-century. Toloraya, who traveled with Kim Jong-il on his recent train journey around Russia, said that he was convinced Kim wanted dialogue and cooperation as an equal. US State Department Northeast Asia expert John Merrill said that he was "guardedly optimistic. Chairman Kim Jong-il seems to be back in diplomatic outreach and summit mode."

Source: Nautilus Daily Report 29 August 2001

Joe Biden on Bush Korea policy

That said, he thinks that Bush's foreign policy mind is up for grabs. Not just between Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell, but also among world leaders and even himself. Bush is now paying attention, he says. "I really do think we underestimate the president in terms of how bright he is and -- not withstanding his lack of inquisitiveness, which he's famous for -- it's an occupational responsibility now.

"I don't think -- I don't know -- but I don't think they have come to know exactly where they are," Biden says. He wonders, though. In its renewed negotiations with North Korea, the Bush administration is demanding a reduction in conventional forces as part of an overall agreement. "Is it a poison pill to make sure we don't get an agreement on missiles so they have a rationale for the urgency of a national missile defense?" Biden asks. "I don't know. I hope not, I hope not. The president assures me no, that's a separate track."

Source: Source: JoongAng Ilbo 2 July 2001

Mr. Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, gave a toughly worded speech intended as an opening salvo in a campaign to slow dramatically the plans to test and perhaps put in place a limited national missile defense system …/..

Mr. Biden said the administration would be wiser to open a dialogue with North Korea that would bring about a "verifiable agreement" to end development, positioning and export of long range missiles by that government.

Source: New York Times September 11, 2001

Painting Pyongyang Into a Corner

SELIG S. HARRISON

In seeking to justify its controversial missile defense program, the Bush administration often warns that North Korea is developing long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States. But is the administration really worried about North Korean missiles? Or are some of the president's more hawkish advisers exaggerating North Korean missile capabilities and sabotaging a détente that could undermine the rationale for missile defense?

From a North Korean perspective, the Bush administration is pursuing confrontational policies that seem calculated to make détente impossible and could indeed drive North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and missiles.

When I was recently in Pyongyang, a leading general, Ri Chan Bok, suddenly said to me over lunch, "What we in the armed forces cannot understand is why we are not entitled to have nuclear weapons and missiles when our principal belligerent adversary, the United States, has thousands of them."

"At this stage," he declared, "I don't know anybody who believes that we need nuclear weapons, but everybody is thinking in that direction in view of the hostile attitude and hostile policies of the Bush administration."../..

The attitude underlying administration policy is that the North Koreans need us more than we need them. But this attitude ignores political realities in Pyongyang. Precisely because North Korea is a small, impoverished country, it is intensely proud and nationalistic. Kim Jong Il is ready for an opening to the United States and South Korea, but he cannot afford the appearance of bowing to superpower pressure.

If the administration does, in fact, want to resume negotiations with North Korea, the first step would be for Mr. Powell to reaffirm that the Jo-Albright declaration is still American policy. This should be accompanied by an agreement to discuss non-nuclear energy assistance. A flat refusal to provide any interim energy assistance would strengthen hard-line sentiment in Pyongyang. "That would mean you are breaking the 1994 agreement," Mr. Paek said. "We would be driven to go our own way."

The North's demand for such assistance is understandable. In 1994, President Clinton pledged to facilitate "interim energy alternatives pending completion of the first reactor." At present, the United States is not even letting South Korea give Pyongyang desperately needed energy assistance that Seoul had promised. This is the principal reason for Kim Jong Il's delay in visiting the South for a second summit meeting. Encouraging South Korean energy aid to the North is the key to a resumption of both the American-North Korean and South Korean-North Korean dialogues.

In addition, the United States should make good on Mr. Clinton's pledge of direct energy assistance, together with food aid, in exchange for an end to North Korean missile exports…/..

Source: New York Times, 2 August 2001

DPRK Stance towards Terrorist Attacks on U.S.

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry today answered the question put by KCNA as regards the large-scale terrorist attacks on the United States. He said: Terrorists' large-scale attacks made on the U.S. by blowing themselves up in planes on Tuesday have caught the international community by great surprise.

The very regretful and tragic incident reminds it once again of the gravity of terrorism.

As a UN member the DPRK is opposed to all forms of terrorism and whatever support to it and this stance will remain unchanged.

The DPRK approaches the incident from this point of view.

Source:, KCNA, 12 September 12, 2001

NZ – DPRK Relations

A NZ delegation visited the DPRK 3-9 July. The members were Graham Kelly, MP, (Leader), Rev Don Borrie, Dr Tim Beal, Dr Stephen Epstein, and Mr Verne Winitana.

DPRK Ambassador to Indonesia, Australia and NZ, Kim Pyong Hong, presented his credentials in Wellington on 29 August 2001. It is anticipated that the DPRK will soon establish an embassy in Canberra cross-credited to NZ.

NZ ambassador to ROK, Roy Ferguson, has been cross-credited to DPRK and it is anticipated that he will present his credentials in Pyongyang late October.

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