Commentary

Roh Moo-hyun’s close but decisive win in the ROK presidential election is welcome for a number of reasons. He represents a generational change, free from some of the historical baggage of the past. His opponent, Lee Hoi-Chang had served as a judge under the military regimes, as his father, it is alleged, served under the Japanese. Roh, by contrast was briefly imprisoned by the military. Older voters supported Lee, younger ones went for Roh. The election was also a defeat for the old elite and represents a deepening of South Korean democracy. Lee was a judge, and a prime minister, Roh was on the other side of the legal fence, a ‘human rights lawyer’. Lee is a graduate of Seoul National University, Roh a graduate of Pusan Commercial High School. Lee also represented a pro-American, anti-DPRK line while Roh is seen as a continuer of Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy.

However, it would not be wise to see Roh’s victory as leading automatically to an improvement in North-South relations. Paradoxically, Lee might have been more likely to bring about better relations, precisely because of his reputation. Lee is an intelligent man and despite the electioneering if he had been president he would have had to recognise the inescapable logic of engagement, of facilitating reform and economic growth in the DPRK and protecting it against the United States. Despite Kim Dae-jung’s achievements, particularly in the final year of the Clinton administration, his sunshine policy was hamstrung not so much because of lack of response from the North, as is commonly alleged, but because he could not deliver against domestic conservative and American opposition, especially under Bush. In that respect Lee would have been in a stronger position to do what was necessary just as Charles de Gaulle and Richard Nixon had in their time with Algeria and China.

Roh will be viewed with scepticism in Washington, though they won’t use that particular word, and he is likely to have an even harden time with Bush than Kim Dae-jung. Not merely is his victory and endorsement of a ‘softer line’ towards the North but it is also owes much to rising anti-Americanism. This has been particularly fuelled by the acquittal, under US military law, of two American soldiers who killed a pair of teenage girls in June. The fact that there has been so much anger over accidental deaths, rather than something like rape and murder, is testimony to a widespread antipathy towards American military presence on South Korea, and towards US Korea policy.

Roh will have a very difficult, perhaps impossible, task in bringing Washington into conformity with Korean needs and realities. Pyongyang, for its part, has been restrained during the election campaign, perhaps aware that too much involvement can be counter-productive, a lesson the Americans also struggled with. However, they, along with Kim Dae-jung’s exiting administration, have kept North-South relations moving forward, despite the furore over the alleged ‘enriched uranium’ issue. It looks as if the long-awaited reconnection of rail and road links will soon be achieved – a temporary road connection is scheduled for Christmas Day. It is to be hoped that Pyongyang will act positively and quickly to the opportunities that Roh’s election offers. If Pyongyang had moved more quickly with Kim Dae-jung a normalisation of relations with the United States might have been achieved before Clinton left office. Pyongyang should also act with sensitivity, recognising Roh’s relative lack of freedom of manoeuvre.

Movement towards normalisation of DPRK-Japan relations, with the prospect of reparations to help fund the economic reforms have stalled with Koizumi effectively kidnapping the abductees. If this is mainly opportunistic popularity-seeking rather than succumbing to US pressure, then things may be happening behind the scenes.

Not so with the US. Despite the media hysteria the nuclear issue is merely a subset of US unwillingness to negotiate. As Boutros Boutros Ghali observed of the US, “Diplomacy is perceived by an imperial power as a waste of time and prestige and a sign of weakness." Short of a debacle in Iraq, the only thing that is likely to incline the Bush administration to real negotiations with Pyongyang is a continuation of anti-Americanism in South Korea and an independent-minded ROK president. Pyongyang should consider what it can do to strengthen Roh’s hand. Perhaps a suspension of the reactivation of the nuclear reactor as a gesture to the president? Perhaps the return visit of Kim Jong Il to Seoul?

Tim Beal

Roh May Pose Dilemma to Bush

President Kim Dae-jung hurriedly flew to Washington in March last year for a summit with new United States President George W. Bush in order to enlist his support for South Korea’s ``Sunshine Policy’’ of engaging North Korea.

Bush turned down Kim’s request, putting Seoul’s inter-Korean reconciliation policy in the doldrums where it remains. The tables have apparently turned. Bush sent his congratulations to President-elect Roh Moo-hyun the day after his election and directly invited him to the U.S. capital for an early summit. According to officials from both sides, Roh’s U.S. visit is expected to take place right after his Feb. 25, 2003, inauguration, with envoys to be exchanged in the meantime.

Bush’s urgency to arrange a face-to-face meeting with Roh is not much different from Kim’s position a year and nine months ago. This time, Bush needs Roh’s support for his hard-line policy toward the Stalinist country’s self-confessed nuclear program. However, the president-elect’s approach will likely be different from Kim’s and could pose a major dilemma for Bush at a time when he can ill afford one. Despite its initial success, Bush’s war on terrorism is showing signs of losing direction as he turns to Iraq, which he has designated part of ``an axis of evil’’ together with North Korea and Iran. At age 57, Roh does not belong to the old school of politicians like Kim who tend to regard U.S. as a ``diplomatic given’’ that Seoul has to live with and are accustomed to following the course set by U.S. In fact, Roh owes his election to the outpouring of support by young voters, who also showed up in recent anti-U.S. demonstrations protesting the acquittals of two U.S. soldiers who were cleared of the negligent homicide of two South Korean schoolgirls in a traffic accident.

Reflecting the view of his young supporters, Roh is expected to drive a hard bargain in addressing the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the legal code governing 37,000 U.S. troops here, which is seen as the root cause for the latest wave of anti-American sentiment. But the most likely source of friction between Roh and Bush is the North’s nuclear problem. With a brand-new five-year mandate ahead, Roh thinks that it is an inter-Korean issue rather than an international issue. In his first post-election press conference Friday, he said in no uncertain terms that he plans to inherit Kim’s reconciliation approach and will take the lead in resolving the issue.

Bush is of the opinion that Pyongyang’s nuclear program is a challenge to the U.S. counter-proliferation policy. ``Roh is a novice as far as foreign affairs are concerned so he will likely rely on President Kim’s heritage regarding his initial course of action on relations with U.S. and policies toward the North,’’ a U.S. watcher said. ``One thing that separates Roh from Kim is that Roh would likely pursue his views even more vigorously than the incumbent president.’’ Making the Roh-Bush equation even more complicated is Pyongyang itself. Pyongyang may find Roh easier to deal with than Lee Hoi-chang, the unsuccessful candidate in the Dec. 19 election who designated the sunshine policy as a failure and advocated a harder line against Pyongyang.

However, if Pyongyang chooses to continue its standoff with the international community, Roh’s reconciliation stance would be compromised, giving a boost to Bush’s stick-first approach to Pyongyang. As things stand, it may not take long to find out who will prevail in setting the future course of action toward Pyongyang.

Source: Korea Times 22 December 2002

Bargain with North Korea

Selig S. Harrison

The North Korean ambassador to the United Nations leaned forward across the luncheon table. "We are ready to negotiate," he told me, "but your people are very highhanded. They demand this; they demand that. They issue one-sided ultimatums to us. We have made clear that we are prepared to resolve all issues of concern to you relating to nuclear weapons and missiles, if only you will address our own concerns."

It was clear from my two-hour conversation with Ambassador Han Song Ryol last week why North Korea has acknowledged that it is attempting to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang is bargaining. The Bush administration should respond positively to its offer to negotiate by building on the 1994 U.S. nuclear-freeze agreement with North Korea, not by abrogating it.

According to North Korean and U.S. accounts, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, meeting on Oct. 4 with visiting U.S. emissary James Kelly, offered to:

· End the effort to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium.

· ·Continue to abide by existing safeguards on plutonium-based nuclear facilities shut down under the 1994 agreement.

· Accept whatever inspection and verification measures are deemed necessary by the United States.

In return, Kang told Kelly, the United States would have to:

· Make a public pledge not to stage a pre-emptive attack on North Korea.

· Sign a peace agreement ending the Korean War and replacing the 1953 armistice.

· Normalize diplomatic relations, thus opening the way for economic aid from U.S.-controlled multilateral financial institutions.

Kelly says he told Kang that this offer was "upside down": North Korea must first shut down its nuclear program. Only then would the USA "consider" what it might do to meet North Korean concerns.

The Bush administration justifies its refusal to bargain by arguing that the enrichment program is a violation of the 1994 U.S.-North Korean agreement, proving that Pyongyang cannot be trusted. North Korea did indeed violate the spirit of the agreement, but not the letter. While the 1994 accord refers to the shared goal of a "nuclear-free Korean peninsula," it covered only specified plutonium-based facilities then in existence.

Moreover, the United States itself has failed to fulfill two key provisions of the accord: steps to normalize relations and "formal assurances" ruling out "the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States" against North Korea.

The new administration's national security doctrine announced on Sept. 20 was, in effect, a repudiation of that second provision, because it asserted that the USA reserves the right to pre-emptively strike - with nuclear weapons, if deemed necessary - any state regarded as a potential peace threat.

North Korea is in a strong bargaining position: It could make four plutonium bombs from spent fuel rods put in storage under the 1994 agreement. ..//..

Instead of abandoning both reactors, the USA should suggest cutting back to one while supporting a gas pipeline ..//.., which could be finished more quickly than the reactors, would run from gas fields off Russia's Sakhalin Island through North Korea to South Korea. ExxonMobil and a Japanese partner control the Sakhalin gas concession and will not pursue a pipeline through North Korea without White House approval.

South Korea wants gas from Sakhalin to offset its dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum. North Korea would get royalties for letting the pipeline pass through its territory and could tap into it to supply some of its own power stations and fertilizer plants…//..

Kim Jong Il's terms for ending his nuclear program are reasonable. Normalizing relations would speed up economic reforms that would moderate the repressive North Korean system. A peace agreement ending the Korean War is long overdue. Without a U.S. pledge not to stage a first strike, North Korea will inevitably seek to develop a nuclear deterrent.

As the USA learned during the 1994 nuclear crisis with Pyongyang, pressure tactics that drive North Korea into a corner will only strengthen hard-line generals there, with potentially disastrous results for North Korea, South Korea and the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed at the 38th parallel.

Source: USA Today, October 22, 2002

'There is a deal here waiting to be made'

Suzanne Goldenberg

Pyongyang's threat to restart its nuclear reactor may push the Bush administration into a North Korea strategy that runs counter to its every instinct, experts said yesterday.

Only months after President Bush denounced North Korea as the eastern end of the "axis of evil", US officials may be forced to talk to Pyongyang to prevent a deepening of the crisis.

For weeks, US officials have insisted there will be no negotiations with North Korea, and no financial inducements for dismantling the uranium-enrichment programme that was discovered last October.

Washington pointedly ignored repeated signals from Pyongyang that it would scrap its programme in return for economic aid.

Last month, the US suspended oil shipments to North Korea which were part of a 1994 agreement under which Pyongyang was to scrap its nuclear programme in return for aid.

However, the US did pledge to resolve the crisis through diplomacy. The strategy backfired yesterday when North Korea said the fuel shortages left it no choice but to restart its reactor.

"It is clear that they have bollocked the management of this relationship terribly, and that there is an escalation of the danger," said Leonard Spector, a former administrator for arms control at the national nuclear security administration. "I think they blundered and they must recalibrate now. I believe they are going to have to have what is called an agonising reappraisal."

Signs of a policy shift are unlikely to emerge before December 19, when South Korea goes to the polls after an election campaign marked by a rise in anti-American sentiment.

However, analysts argue that Washington has left itself little scope for manoeuvre…//.. Commentators in Seoul have also accused Washington of interfering in the election campaign on behalf of the conservative opposition candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, who advocates a tougher line on North Korea. ..//..

Since last October, critics of the Bush administration's policy have argued that North Korea is in fact making a clumsy attempt to open negotiations for the scrapping of its weapons.

Joseph Cirincione, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "Basically, we can buy the North Korean nuclear programme and for not very much money. There is a deal here waiting to be made."

Source: Guardian 13 December 2002

Inter-Korean trade up 34%

Inter-Korean trade through October was up nearly 34 percent year on year.

The Unification Ministry said Wednesday that South Korea imported nearly $180 million worth of goods, mostly farming produce, fishery products, metal goods and textiles, from North Korea. The figure is a 35 percent increase from the same period last year. The South exported $261 million worth of goods -- a 33 percent rise. ..//..

"But there's a steady increase in commercial trade especially in the sectors of fisheries, textiles and processing trade," the ministry said. It added the South's supply of railway equipment and food loans are also contributing to increasing the exchanges between the two Koreas.

Source: JoongAng Ilbo 13 November 2002

See later story Inter-Korean trade up 57%

North claims rise in exports of computer software

North Korea proudly disclosed its 2002 exports of computer software doubled year-on-year since 2001.

The official Korean Central Broadcasting said Mansong Technical Development Company, one of the country's software producers and exporters, has been quite successful in developing various Internet applications, including an online conference system, reservation system, a system for compatibility of various bookkeeping programs, certification system and more. ..//..

A South Korean businessman, Kim Bom-hoon, who recently returned from a lengthy stay in the North, testified recently that the country's schools currently produce over 2,000 computer programmers a year.

Source: JoongAng Ilbo 7 November 2002

North interested in strengthening role of banks

Amid a series of unprecedented measures to improve its economy, North Korea recently revealed its interest in strengthening the role of its banks.

The recent edition of the nation's economic magazine, Kyungjae Yeongu, stressed that in order to actively push for economic recovery, strong capital is a must and banks must play the role of converting idle assets to functional ones.

"With the changes to the nation's economic system it has become more efficient to take advantage of bank loans and company capital in order to meet the demands of capital supply than mobilizing state budget," the magazine said. ..//..

Source: JoongAng Ilbo 7 November 2002

NZ-DPRK relations

New DPRK ambassador to NZ

Chon Jae Hong, who is resident in Canberra, was in Wellington 9-15 December to present his credentials to the Governor-General, Dame Silvia Cartwright. Mr Chon was accompanied by Second Secretary Ma Tong Hui. The Koreans also called on Jonathan Hunt (Speaker) Marion Hobbs (Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs), Peter Dunne and Graham Kelly. They had discussions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. They met with business representatives and with Geoff Robinson of Radio NZ who recently visited Pyongyang.

Rev Don Borrie and Tim Beal discussed with them ways to develop NZ-DPRK relations including people-to-people contacts, exploration of business possibilities, aid and training.

Mr Chon outlined the additional privations that will be imposed upon the people of his country by the US suspension of fuel oil. He expressed a keen interest in getting to know New Zealand better, suggesting that because of geography and topography our agricultural, horticultural and forestry expertise was particularly appropriate.

Call for emergency aid

Rev Don Borrie has written to Prime Minister Helen Clark urging an emergency relief grant to help alleviate suffering by the ordinary people in DPRK during the coming Korean winter.