Pyongyang Report

Vol 6 No 3 June 2004

In this issue-

n American impasse continues

n Germany opens reading room in Pyongyang

n Korean Civil Society groups attack US human rights bill

n NZ and DPRK – a developing relationship

Commentary

A hundred years ago, when the British public was anxious for news about their troops besieged by the Boers, The Times used to report daily ‘no news from Mafeking’. Today, the media is less hesitant about writing when there is no news, but even so has been hard put to say anything about the Six Party Talks in Beijing. There was a meeting of the working group 12-14 May, but nothing appears to have been achieved, and nothing much was expected. We reproduce an extract from an important interview with Selig Harrison before the talks in which he predicts, quite rightly, the US administration will continue to refuse to enter meaningful negotiations. The only thing that happened that aroused a scintilla of hope was a discussion about resuming the provision of light water reactors to the DPRK, promised under the Agreed Framework but suspended by the US. The American delegate, Joseph DeTrani, according to a rather confused story in the Washington Post, apparently responded to a DPRK question by ‘renew[ing] an offer to give North Korea a light-water nuclear reactor program -- less suitable for making nukes -- in return for their giving up their nuclear program and submitting to inspections.’ All this sounds suspiciously like the Agreed Framework which the administration had been at such pains to cast off. He even ‘allegedly mused that, as part of an overall deal, Washington might look at President Bush signing some security assurances in a bilateral ceremony or even promising never to use nukes on North Korea.’ This would have been news from Beijing, because it could well have marked a breakthrough, but it was not to be. DeTrani did what US negotiators in these talks are not supposed to do, negotiate, and the State Department moved quickly to deny the offers. This had echoes of the intervention by the White House (i.e. Cheney) at the last round of the talks in February when it seemed that the Chinese might get an allusion to peace in the final statement.

So the impasse continues, and there seems little likelihood of it being cleared before the election. Not that the administration is not under substantial pressure. It is planning to withdraw troops from Korea to send to Iraq. Sources close to former State Department North Korea chief Jack Pritchard have publicised estimates that the DPRK now has eight nuclear weapons, that is, six more than the estimate of Agreed Framework days. In other words, a three-fold increase ‘on Bush’s watch’ and as a direct result of the administration’s abandonment of the AF and its refusal to negotiate. The Japanese have also been showing signs of impatience. Whatever the domestic considerations of Koizumi’s second summit with Kim Jong Il, it also seems to reflect a desire to distance himself from US policy and the imbroglio in Iraq, where two Japanese journalists have been killed and Japanese troops (like their NZ counterparts) could well suffer an electorally damaging catastrophe.

Meanwhile, Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry has been making noises about the need to negotiate with the DPRK. It seems unlikely that Pyongyang has any illusions about Kerry, and suggestions that it is holding off negotiations until the election don’t hold water. The DPRK would cut a deal if something meaningful were on offer.

The reinstatement of President Roh Moo-hyun, and the peace feelers towards the North of Opposition leader Park Geun-hye (daughter of Park Chung-hee) will stiffen the ROK’s resistance to Washington.

Will Bush budge? I doubt it, but one never knows what might happen as the election campaign progress and Iraq continues to pose a danger to his re-election. There may be a calculation somewhere along the line that he needs to outflank Kerry on the peace front, and if so, there may be news from Beijing. Let us hope so. Better to compete on virtue, even hypocritically, than on vice, better peace than war.

But I won’t hold my breath. Bush will continue to campaign as ‘a war president’. Will Kerry have the courage to go for peace?

Tim Beal

Harrison Faults Bush Administration NK Policy

Harrison Faults Bush Administration for Rejecting Step-by-Step Accords to Halt North Korea's Nuclear Program

Selig S. Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy and a longtime expert on North Korea, says Pyongyang is "eager" to start step-by-step negotiations with Washington to freeze and end its nuclear program. But the United States, Harrison says, refuses to take up the offer. Harrison recently returned from North Korea-his eighth visit since 1972-where he met with Kim Yong Nam, the second in command to leader Kim Jong Il, as well as with the foreign minister, the vice foreign minister, and the spokesman for the North Korean Army…//..

Q: You recently returned from your eighth trip to North Korea. What was the mood there on making progress on the nuclear issue, which has bedeviled relations ever since 2002?

A: I found the North Korean leadership extremely eager to find a way to conclude a nuclear deal with the United States. They need such a deal urgently because North Korea embarked on significant economic reforms in the middle of 2002, and these [reforms] have intensified the economic pressures that confront its leadership. These pressures make large-scale aid to modernize the country's infrastructure extremely important, particularly in the energy, water, and transportation fields.

So they want improved relations with the United States. As part of that, the nuclear issue would be settled. In North Korea's plan, as its fear of the United States diminishes and as the denuclearization process proceeds, the North Koreans will be getting installments of aid in payment for, or tied to, the concessions they make in the denuclearization process. I found them very eager for settlement, but the problem is, while they're eager and they need [a deal], but they are not prepared to do it in the way the Bush administration is asking them to do it. The North Koreans say that Washington wants them to, in effect, simply roll over and disarm unilaterally.

Q: What is the Bush administration's position at this moment?

Its position is that North Korea should agree to what [administration officials] call the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling [CVID] of its nuclear program at the outset of the negotiating process. That is to say, before administration officials tell the North Koreans what they are going to give them [in return for CVID], or before they start on any process of step-by-step concessions-which is what North Korea wants in return for step-by-step denuclearization-the administration wants North Korea to disarm completely in the nuclear field. ..//..

Q: Has the United States hinted, unofficially or in side talks, what benefits would be in store for North Korea if it agreed to CVID?

A: No, I don't think so. The most officials have done is suggest that when the process gets started, they will tell South Korea, which has been thinking of providing energy aid to North Korea, that the United States would no longer object to such aid, which it now does. But they haven't been willing to talk about any significant changes in the U.S. posture toward North Korea.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations, 10 May 2004

Light Water and Heavy Denials

The fallout continues over U.S. special envoy to North Korea Joseph DeTrani's efforts a couple of weeks ago in yet another meeting with the North Koreans about their nuclear weapons programs…//..

DeTrani apparently took a somewhat creative approach to find ways to move the talks along. The Washington Times reported that he renewed an offer to give North Korea a light-water nuclear reactor program -- less suitable for making nukes -- in return for their giving up their nuclear program and submitting to inspections.

The State Department said absolutely no offer was made, although the North Koreans brought up the light-water reactor idea. But there was much unhappiness among Pentagon and Hill hard-liners who want no concessions to the North Koreans until after they give up their nuke program. There was chatter that DeTrani had overstepped his bounds. (Or maybe read from the wrong paper?) DeTrani, we're told, made no specific promises on other matters to the Kim Jong Il crowd, which proudly boasts about lying through its teeth when it agreed in 1994 to forgo its program. Rather, DeTrani tossed out broad ideas.

Even so, some meeting participants are said to have almost passed out when he allegedly mused that, as part of an overall deal, Washington might look at President Bush signing some security assurances in a bilateral ceremony or even promising never to use nukes on North Korea. After all, a lot of nations in Asia have been relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for a long time.

But a State Department official said yesterday that DeTrani did not offer bilateral, only multilateral, security assurances. In any event, the North Koreans naturally said no to everything. The scheduled five-day round of talks ended after three days, allowing time for any damage-repair efforts to begin promptly.

Source: Washington Post 28 May 2004

Dubious Threat, Expensive Defense

By now it's common knowledge that before Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration's attention was focused not on terrorism but on other national security priorities -- most notably missile defense. The administration's more reasonable defenders argue that this was a forgivable miscalculation, and that after al Qaeda's attack on New York and Washington, President Bush utterly remade his agenda.

Only he didn't -- at least not in one large respect. The president may have declared war on terrorism and launched invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. But for the past 21/2 years, his Pentagon has quietly but implacably persisted in pursuing, without alteration, the previous No. 1 mission. The result is a breakneck, hugely expensive and quite risky attempt to build and activate a national missile defense before the November election. ..//..

It's a project being pursued with a lack of safeguards that could be justified only by a national emergency. Its logic is that the greatest threat to this country is not a terrorist's smuggling of a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon but the possibility of a surprise missile attack by North Korea.

That threat looked somewhat plausible six years ago, when North Korea tested a missile possibly capable of reaching Hawaii and parts of Alaska with a heavy payload. But the regime of Kim Jong Il hasn't tested since then; it is currently negotiating about giving up its arsenal. Though the North probably has several nuclear weapons, no one believes it has built a miniaturized warhead capable of being placed on a long-range missile. No other hostile country has, or will have soon, a missile that can reach the United States. ..//..

The Bush policy nevertheless assumes that some kind of defense, however raw, must be put in place immediately -- and that's where the recklessness starts. Over three years, the administration has poured more than $25 billion into missile defense but has made only modest technological progress. According to experts both in and outside the Pentagon, a defense deployed this year could not be regarded as reliable by even the most basic standards. ..//..

The Pentagon's own chief tester, Thomas Christie, says he is not sure the new system could stop a missile from North Korea. At a Senate hearing last month, he was asked whether, even if it did work, the system's makeshift radar would allow it to protect Hawaii, the only state fully within range of the only missile North Korea has (once) tested. Answer: "We have not done a thorough analysis. At this point, I can't say one way or another." ..//..

Given the development problems and the shift in the security landscape since Sept. 11, the pragmatic course would be to postpone the activation of the system until its bugs are ironed out -- a step that would save billions. Instead, Bush proposes to spend $10 billion more on missile defense next year and $53 billion in the next five years. As the fall campaign heats up, he will make activation of missile defense a part of his "war president" profile and dare Democrats to oppose him. ..//

Source: Washington Post 26 April 2004

Kerry Says Security Comes First

..//..Kerry also accused the administration of having no plan to deal with North Korea's rush to build its nuclear weapons arsenal. He derided the Bush administration's long effort to set up six-nation talks to resolve the impasse over North Korea's nuclear ambitions as a "fig leaf" designed to cover up its failure to have a coherent policy.

Kerry said he would immediately begin bilateral negotiations with North Korea -- a goal the Pyongyang government has long sought. But, perhaps in a nod to the sensitivities of the Japanese, the South Koreans and the Chinese, he said he would not abandon the six-nation talks.

"I would keep them both going," Kerry said. "I would do the six-party [talks], but I would engage in bilateral discussions."

The Bush administration has argued that bilateral talks would reward North Korea for its behavior, and has contended that it is necessary to include the other nations to ensure a regional solution. Kerry declined to say what he would offer North Korea as inducements to give up its weapons but said he would be willing to discuss a broad agenda that includes reducing troop levels on the Korean peninsula, replacing the armistice that ended the Korean War and even reunifying North and South Korea.

Kerry said Bush has made a serious mistake by not talking directly with Pyongyang. Of the North Korean leader, he said his advisers -- such as former defense secretary William J. Perry and former national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger -- told him that when they were in the Clinton administration "they had no illusion that Kim Jong Il was probably cheating over here and [creating] trouble over there, but they were getting the process of a dialogue to get a verification structure."

"You are better off engaged in that effort than disengaged," Kerry said.

Source: Washington Post 30 May 2004

Korean Nuclear Controversy

It seems to be quite obvious that the ongoing six-way talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons issue will lead all participants on a road to nowhere. It is because in such endeavors, the fundamental issues concerning the whole community of nations remain unresolved.

The first basic question is that while the United States, Russia and China can have nuclear weapons, why not India, Pakistan and Korea? Let both North and South Koreas develop nuclear weapons. It would enhance their sense of security and lessen their fear of each other…//..

The second question, is that when big powers earn trillions of trillions by selling all kinds of arms and ammunitions to other countries, why are they so anxious to deprive lesser powers of small benefits of a few million by transferring their nuclear technologies and materials to needy nations? Do the arms and ammunitions sold by the big powers not kill and destroy? Is it the responsibility of only small nations to maintain world peace? If the big powers are so concerned about world peace, why don't they dismantle their own nuclear arsenals?..//..

Brahm Swaroop Agrawal,

Visiting Fellow of the Korea Foundation.

Source: Korea Times 2 June 2004

The Korean Civil Society Statement on human rights

The Korean Civil Society Statement Regarding The North Korean Freedom Act of 2003 and North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004

By MINBYUN (Lawyers for a Democratic Society), SARANGBANG Group for Human Rights, Good Friends, Center for Peace and Disarmament of the PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), Catholic Human Rights Committee in Korea, The Human Rights Committee The National Council of Churches in Korea, Civil Network for A Peaceful Korea, Solidarity for Peace & Human Rights, Korean House for International Solidarity, DASAN Human Rights Center, Korea Reunification Alliance for 6.15 Joint Declaration Attainment and Peace in Korea.

Korean civil society is watching with grave concern the development of the North Korean Freedom Act of 2003, and the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, now pending in the U.S. Congress. If passed, both bills will have significant impact on future negotiations over human rights issues in North Korea. In reviewing the North Korean Freedom Act in particular, we have concluded that the proposed bill will negatively affect the fragile dialogue process under way to establish sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula while jeopardizing the chance to improve human rights conditions in North Korea.

Source: Email from PeaceNoWar 25 April 2004

Goethe Lands in North Korea

After years of delicate negotiation Germany's Goethe Institute is becoming the first western cultural institute to open a reading room in the North Korean capital Pyongyang, a major cultural coup…//..

Among the sticking points were unrestricted access to the reading room as well as uncensored and open presentation of the materials, Schmelter said.

There's also hope that the reading room will be followed by other projects: At a dinner following the signing of the contract, a North Korean official in charge of cultural cooperation with other countries said she hoped Germans would see the deal as her country's willingness to open up.

Source: Deutsche-Welle

NZ-DPRK relations

Richard Nunns and Kingi Taurua participated in the 2044 April Spring Friendship Arts Festival in Pyongyang, 9-19 April, with financial support from Asia 2000. They were accompanied by Don Borrie (Chairman) and Tim Beal (Secretary) representing the NZ-DRPK Society and were hosted by the Korea-NZ Friendship and Cultural Society. Don Borrie and Tim Beal visited the Korean Christian Federation and Pongsu Church, the Korea-NZ Friendship Farm and the Korea-NZ Friendship School, both recently designated. They also travelled to Wonsan in order to promote relations between that city and Porirua. They had discussions with Richard Ragan and Jakob Kern of the World Food Programme, and visited the WFP-supported biscuit factory in Munchon. They also had meetings with DPRK Red Cross and the National Tourism Administration. They received financial support from the Council for International Development and the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa/NZ (PCANZ).

NZ Ambassador to DPRK and ROK, David Taylor, was in Pyongyang in May and amongst other activities visited the Korea-NZ Friendship School, and the Korea-NZ Friendship and Cultural Society.

Rev Stuart Vogel, Co-Convener of Global Ministries of PCANZ, also visited Pyongyang in order to develop relations with the Korean Christian Federation.