Commentary

One advantage of being so far behind schedule in producing Pyongyang Report is that some issues which were on our minds a couple of months ago no longer need be discussed. What would a Kerry policy on Korea look like, for instance, is no longer of much interest. However, before we leave the Democrats and focus solely on the Republicans, of various stripes, it is worthwhile to wonder what might have happened if Gore had won the election. Helen Clark famously said that the US under Gore would not have invaded Iraq and got famously into trouble for pointing that out. What would have happened if there had been no Powell/Armitage team at State, protecting their backs from the neo-cons but determined to overturn the policy of their predecessor – the ABC, Anything But Clinton, policy? What, in other words, if there had been a continuation of the Clinton policy with, for the sake of argument, less obstruction from Congress? With continued pressure from Kim Dae-jung relations between Pyongyang and Washington might have improved quite rapidly with the lifting of sanctions, removal from the terrorism list and normalisation of relations. The Agreed Framework would have continued and the construction of Light Water Reactors would still be late but there might have been sufficient progress to keep Pyongyang satisfied that Washington was honouring the bargain.

With no US obstruction, not merely would North-South relations have moved ahead faster (and it is important to recognise how they have developed despite the first Bush administration) but crucially there would have been a breakthrough in Japan-DPRK relations leading to speedy resolution of the abductee issue and to normalisation of relations. That in turn would have meant Japanese reparations and the lifting of restraints on trade, leading to a revival of DPRK exports to Japan. This improvement of external economic relations would have led to a quickening of the economic reform and marketisation process within the DPRK itself. Crucially, there would probably have been no crisis over the alleged enriched uranium programme; if Washington did have genuine concerns then, in the right atmosphere, Pyongyang would have moved to allay them because normalisation of relations with Washington is, and remains, the dominant foreign policy goal on which all else depends. So, no renewed nuclear crisis, but an economically rehabilitating DPRK and a stable and peaceful Northeast Asia moving to solve the problems of the past.

None of this came to pass, as we know, but it is important to realise that it could have had different policies and a less aggressive approach been adopted by Washington. But, to employ the phrase of William Perry in his report to Clinton, we must look at the world he way it is, not as we would want it to be. George W. Bush has been re-elected with sufficient edge to claim political capital to spend as he wishes, unimpeded by Congress or the Legislature which are increasingly on his side if not entirely in his hands. He has got rid of Powell (and with him, Armitage) and replaced him with the ‘trusted’ Condoleezza Rice. What now?

As many commentators have pointed out, the American public may be in for a rough ride, with increasing political and social repression. A taste of that was the two-year jail sentence on Californian shopkeeper John Joungwoong Yai for being a ‘North Korean agent’, which appears mainly to have consisted of surreptitiously sending press cuttings to Pyongyang. However, whatever the second Bush administration may do at home, egged on by the religious right, its freedom of action abroad is severely constrained. As American financed polls confirm. it is increasingly disliked and hated around the world. It has awesome military power and capabilities but these have been stretched to the limits, and beyond. Iraq has shown that the US can conquer and kill, but is not able to control. In respect of Korea it faces the same constraints as before. Military options are not feasible, nor is a blockade. However, if the regional powers, principally ROK and China, can restrain the US from war, they cannot make it choose peace. Only the US government can do that.

And here we come to a glimmer of hope. If Rice becomes Secretary of State, as can be presumed, then she will face many intractable problems around the world, especially in the Middle East. She may have been party to their making, or exacerbation, but she carries no personal baggage from Powell. The one place she can, with relative ease, extricate the US from a crisis is on the Korean peninsula. If she (unobtrusively) moves to negotiations this will be welcomed, and reciprocated, in Pyongyang and applauded in Seoul, and elsewhere. There are plenty of formulas for negotiations, and the influential International Crisis Group released one on 15 November. A step-by-step process to resolve the crisis could, with good will, be put together without much difficulty.

The one heritage of the Powell/Armitage period that would be troublesome (if Washington genuinely believes it) is the enriched uranium allegation, which the DPRK strongly denies. If Pyongyang is telling the truth, there is no way they can prove it. If they do have some programme then admitting it would give a hostage to fortune; Washington could always claim it was not satisfied that the programme was abandoned and renege on promises. This is a problem, but not as intractable as the ones found in the Middle East, and a solution could be found, if Rice wants it. Like Nixon before her, Rice does not have to worry about being accused of being ‘soft on communism’; Nixon mended bridges with Beijing, Rice could do the same with Pyongyang. She might just decide that Korea offers an opportunity to claim a foreign policy victory where her predecessor had left crisis and failure.

Tim Beal

Roh Tries to Curb Hawkish US Policy

LOS ANGELES - President Roh Moo-hyun's stronger-than-ever message to the United States over North Korea's nuclear issue seems to be part of his efforts to avert a possible unfavorable change in U.S. policy on the communist state.

Ahead of summit talks with U.S. President George W. Bush in Chile this weekend, Roh clearly expressed objections to any military option backed by ``neocons,'' many of whom are expected to be included in the new security lineup of a second-term Bush.

Though he didn't mention Bush by name, Roh warned on Friday in Los Angeles that taking a hard-line over the North's nuclear issue could have ``grave'' consequences.

``Koreans, who haven't gotten over the trauma of the Korean War half a century ago, do not want another war on the peninsula,'' he told the Los Angeles World Affairs Council at the St. Regis Hotel in Century City.

He also stressed that North Korea has not engaged in terrorism since 1987 and that there was no evidence to link it to terrorist organizations now.

Seoul has so far been hanging in the balance between Washington and Pyongyang, eager to bring them together at the six-party negotiation table, aimed at finding a solution to the lingering standoff over the nuclear issue.

Roh's remarks, made in his first official speech since Bush's re-election, showed Seoul's strong commitment to a peaceful resolution to the nuclear standoff, while seeking close consultation with Washington by narrowing points of difference between the allies' stance on the North, experts said. ..//..

In the Los Angeles speech, Roh also stressed that ``this (peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis) is our strong wish for the people of the U.S., the only ally of South Korea, and will be the most important factor in strengthening our friendship.'' ..//..

Source: Korea Times 14 November 2004

DPRK does not insist on bilateral talks- officIal

Pyongyang, November 13 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK gave the following answer to a question put by KCNA Saturday as regards some misinformation about the prospect of the resumption of the six-party talks afloat in the United States after the presidential election: Some American media recently spread nonsensical stories that the six-party talks could not succeed because the DPRK insisted on the bilateral talks between the DPRK and the U.S. only.

This is nothing but sophism making profound confusing of the right and wrong. As already known, the six-party talks were realized thanks to the positive initiative of the DPRK and their present deadlock is entirely attributable to the U.S. far-fetched assertion. On various occasions the DPRK clarified that it stands for settling the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. through dialogue and negotiations and it does not stick to the form of the talks aimed to solve it.

As for the bilateral talks, the DPRK has neither expected nor waited for them as the U.S. has been opposed to that kind of talks. Accordingly, the DPRK does not feel any need to ask the U.S. for the bilateral talks as it is not ready to hold them.

Moreover, it does not stand to reason for the DPRK to try to hold any bilateral talks with the party which is hatching plots "to bring down the DPRK's system."

For the U.S. to make its policy switchover is the key to finding a solution to the issue. If the U.S. drops its hostile policy aimed at "bringing down the system" in the DPRK and opts for co-existing with the latter in practice, it will be quite possible to settle the issue. The DPRK will go ahead to attain its desired goal strictly according to its independent judgment and in the state interests.

Source: KCNA, Pyongyang, 13 November

President Signals No Major Shift In Foreign Policy

President Bush faces an array of difficult foreign policy issues in his second term, but he appears unlikely to change the overall direction of an assertive diplomacy that has riled some key allies and led to rising anti-Americanism around the globe, according to administration officials and outside experts.

Administration officials acknowledge that they are considering stylistic shifts and will look for opportunities to reach out to estranged allies. With the election behind them, officials hope policy toward Iraq will not be as politicized, and that nations that have withheld assistance in the hope that Bush would lose will rethink their position.

Some changes will depend on whether key players in Bush's first-term team -- such as fierce rivals Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld -- are replaced. New personnel would lead to a review of policies and, possibly, some shifts in tactics, but the direction would still be set by Bush and Vice President Cheney, a highly influential figure on foreign policy.

..//..

Richard Haass, the State Department's director of policy planning in the first two years of Bush's current term, said that rarely has a president faced such a challenging period in foreign policy. Besides having 135,000 service members engaged in a protracted conflict in Iraq, he said, Bush will need to continue the fight against al Qaeda, confront the prospect that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons and that North Korea will bolster its nuclear arsenal, reassess Arab-Israeli policy to account for Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat's death and find a solution to the genocide in Sudan's Darfur region.

But Haass, now president of the Council on Foreign Relations, said Bush will be constrained in his options, in part because of soaring budget deficits and record borrowing from countries overseas (known as the "current account deficit") and in part because so many U.S. forces are stationed in Iraq. "The war of choice against Iraq has narrowed choices elsewhere for U.S. foreign policy," especially the ability to initiate new wars, Haass said.

President Ronald Reagan was widely disliked overseas in his first term for his tough policies toward the Soviet Union, and then shifted in his second term toward a more conciliatory approach. Some experts have suggested that Bush, interested in establishing a legacy, will be forced to be more pragmatic, especially in light of problems that resulted from the Iraq war…//..

Two critical issues -- restraining the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea -- do not have good military options and will require close coordination with allies. ..//..

Source: Glenn Kessler, The Washington Post, 7 November 2004

US Trained for Strikes on NK

The United States had active contingency plans as recently as 1998 to drop up to 30 nuclear warheads on North Korea in case of an attack on Seoul, according to declassified documents from the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government departments.

Japan's Kyodo News Agency reported Sunday that as part of the U.S.' ``scenario 5027,'' 24 F15-E bombers flew simulation missions at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in North Carolina to drop mock nuclear bombs on a firing range in Florida between January and June 1998. ..//..

The newly declassified documents also showed the U.S. kept nuclear weaponry in South Korea until at least 1998, despite officially claiming it had withdrawn all nuclear warheads in 1991, Kyodo reported. ..//..

Source: Reuben Staines, Korea Times 7 November 2004

KCNA on Nuclear Scandal in S. Korea

Pyongyang, September 18 (KCNA) -- The recent disclosure of nuclear-related secret experiments in succession in south Korea is stirring up a big furor in the international community. South Korea made a clandestine laser-aided uranium enrichment experiment in 2000 and a series of plutonium extraction experiments in 1982.

No sooner had the nuclear scandal been disclosed than the United States and the south Korean authorities lost no time to assert that the experiments had nothing to do with the development of nuclear weapons only to arouse a bigger suspicion.

It is open secret that south Korea decided in the 1970s when it was under military dictatorship to develop nuclear weapons and its researchers have since pursued nuclear experiments at the "Taedok Research Center".

In the 1990s it made uranium enrichment experiments in secrecy and 150kg of metal uranium was churned out from a nuclear facility out of three nuclear facilities whose existence was not reported to the IAEA.

The continued disclosure of experiments in south Korea clearly proves that they were directed by the U.S. as they are aimed to develop nuclear weapons. ..//..

It is only the U.S. that tries to hush up the case, asserting that there is no cause for concern, though the international community is unanimously demanding a thorough probe into the truth behind the nuclear-related secret experiments in south Korea. This reveals the U.S. intention to wink at south Korea's nuclear weapons development as it did Israel's.

What infuriates the DPRK is that the U.S. has so far shut its eyes to the secret nuclear activities of its allies under its nuclear umbrella but has pressurized the DPRK to accept the CVID. ..

This means that the six countries having either access to nuclear weapons or perfect capability to develop them sat at the negotiating table to discuss the DPRK's nuclear issue only. ..//..

In order to avert an arms race and ensure lasting peace and security in Northeast Asia it is necessary for the U.S. to come out to dialogue with willingness to drop its double-standards, the root cause of the nuclear issue, and renounce its hostile policy toward the DPRK in practice.

Source: KCNA Pyongyang 18 September

KAL Bombing Constant Source of Dispute

The ruling party's plan to launch a new investigation into the 1987 bombing of a Korean Air (KAL) passenger plane is facing strong resistance from the nation's conservative circle, including the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS)..//..

The KAL case resurfaced last week with Rep. Chun Jung-bae, floor leader of the Uri Party, saying that he will try to legislate a bill to start a new probe. Many Uri Party members said they want the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths to be in charge of the investigation.

The commission is limited to carrying out investigations into suspicious deaths that are linked to the country's democracy movement…//..

The Boeing 747 from Abu Dhabi to Seoul via Bangkok exploded over the Indian Ocean when a bomb on board was detonated, killing 115 passengers, including 20 crew members.

The NIS concluded that two North Korean agents, including Kim Hyon- hee, blew up the plane under a direct order from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to thwart the opening of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988.

The female spy was brought to Seoul on Dec. 15, a day before the presidential election, in which Roh Tae-woo, then the ruling party's candidate, was elected.

There has been a suspicion that some spy agents loyal to Roh and his predecessor Chun Doo-hwan had plotted the bombing to bounce back the popularity of the then ruling camp in the lead up to the 1987 presidential election.

It was common for the past regimes in the South to use the North's potential military threat as a bait for the public to vote for the ruling party candidates, who argued they had strong and stable power to protect the country.

The Supreme Court sentenced Kim Hyon-hee to death in March 1990. But Roh, the then head of state, gave her a special pardon the next month. In December 1997 she married a secret agent who had guarded her.

Many domestic media, including The Korea Times, had tried to contact her for an interview, but she declined.

Her testimony is considered a key to solving the current controversy over the truth of the KAL accident because there has been a strong argument that Kim was not a North Korean spy at all.

Source: Park Song-wu, Korea Times 11 July 2004

Anti-Spy Agency to Reinvestigate Suspicious Cases

The country's anti-spy agency is ready to reinvestigate 13 suspicious incidents that were allegedly covered up by past authoritarian governments, including the 1987 bombing of a passenger plane, sources in the parliament's Intelligence Committee said Thursday.

National Intelligence Service (NIS) officials outlined a plan to begin the fact-finding project during an Intelligence Committee meeting at the National Assembly. ..//..

The two most intriguing elements in the 13-case list are the 1987 bombing case of a Korean Air (KAL) passenger jet and the 1996 slush fund scandal, in which NIS funds were allegedly provided to former President Kim Young-sam before the parliamentary polls. ..//..

Due to the timing of her arrival at Seoul, many have believed that Kim Hyon-hee was not a North Korean spy at all and the bombing was a political plot to turn the election to Roh Tae-woo's advantage.

Source: Park Song-wu ,Korea Times 26 August 2004