Commentary

The mainstream press made much of Pyongyang’s statement of 10 February which outlined its reasons for ‘suspending participation’ in the Six Party Talks. The press focussed on a small part of the statement which said that the DPRK had ‘manufactured nukes for self defense’ and exuberantly declared that this was the first time it had ‘admitted’ or ‘boasted’ (the use of one of these inappropriate words seems mandatory) to having nuclear weapons. In fact the DPRK had said much the same thing a number of times before and it is apparent that the Bush administration does not believe that it has the ability to deploy a meaningful nuclear deterrent, deliverable against US territory, any time soon. General LaPorte, the US commander in Korea suggested ten years in testimony before Congress. By focusing on the question of Pyongyang’s nuclear programme the press was able to sidestep the main issue: why Pyongyang had decided, at that time, publicly to withdraw from the talks and the reasons for, and conditions of, that suspension.

The departure of Powell and his team from the State Department, and the appointment of Condoleezza Rice, gave the administration the opportunity of adjusting their East Asia policy, without loss of face, if it so desired. It would have been relatively easy to negotiate a solution to the ‘Korean nuclear issue’. All the other parties, bar Japan which is ambivalent, were strongly in favour of a peaceful resolution that would have produced a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, peaceful coexistence between Washington and Pyongyang with normal diplomatic relations and the lifting of sanctions so that the DPRK could proceed with economic reform and rehabilitation of the economy. The key to this was negotiations. Powell had refused to negotiate, believing that pressure on all parties would produce the results he desired without concessions. Would Rice follow the same path? East Asia capitals seemed to think there was a possibility of a change of policy and Pyongyang, Beijing and especially Seoul made efforts to bring that about.

President Roh Moo-hyun made a high profile tour of Asia and Europe, ‘seeking allies beyond the US’ as the Seoul JoongAng Ilbo put it, repeatedly calling for ‘a peaceful resolution to the diplomatic impasse’, which in the context is code for negotiations. He also warned against either expecting the DPRK to collapse, or wanting that. Having delivered an unambiguous, if diplomatic, message to Washington he stopped on the way home to inspect ROK troops in Iraq, a symbol of the rather unsavoury but practical deal he had done with Bush in an earlier attempt to soften US policy. He subsequently appointed Hong Seok-hyun, publisher of the conservative JoongAng Ilbo as ambassador to Washington. Amongst other things, Hong had a PhD from Stanford, where Rice had been provost.

China, which had issues with the US beyond Korea, was also to apply diplomatic pressure. Significantly, it was revealed in Seoul in February that there had been a secret, and perhaps joint, approaches from South Korea and China for Bush to avoid inflammatory vituperation against Pyongyang in his State of the Union speech. In the event he was less abusive than in the ‘Axis of Evil’ speech but the references to removing tyranny from the world, combined with Rice’s description of the DPRK as an ‘outpost of tyranny’ was enough to convince Pyongyang that US was continuing it hostile policy to bring about ‘regime change’.

Earlier the DPRK had had hosted a couple of Congressional delegation and had had gone to pains that it wanted not merely peaceful coexistence but even friendly relations with the US.

By rebuffing Pyongyang, Washington was also rebuffing Beijing and Seoul. The commitment of the second Bush administration to confrontation was subsequently hammered home with nomination of Wolfowitz to head the World Bank and John Bolton to be ambassador to the UN. Concomitant with US policy, Tokyo’s relations with Seoul (Tokto), Pyongyang (abductees) and China (Taiwan) have plunged to new depths. It is rumoured that Seoul is moving away from Washington to form an alliance with China. The first Bush administration brought about a crisis on the Korean peninsula with probably fraudulent accusations about an enriched uranium programme in the DPRK. Selig Harrison has pointed out that Washington has not provided any evidence to the other countries of the Six Party Talks, a point corroborated recently by Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. The second Bush administration looks set to create a new Cold War (and perhaps worse) in East Asia. The fissure lines are widening. On the one side we have the United States, Taiwan and a Japan moving towards remilitarisation. On the other, Beijing, Pyongyang, and increasingly, Seoul. The two camps have quite different internal dynamics, and Seoul’s position is less stable. However, the confrontation will increasingly gather a momentum of its own, as well as being exacerbated by the US drive for global hegemony, and especially domination of the Middle East.

Tim Beal

DPRK Foreign Ministry statements

(excerpts)

10 February 2005

The second-term Bush administration's intention to antagonize the DPRK and isolate and stifle it at any cost has become quite clear.

As we have clarified more than once, we justly urged the U.S. to renounce its hostile policy toward the DPRK whose aim was to seek the latter's "regime change" and switch its policy to that of peaceful co-existence between the two countries. We have closely followed with patience what policy the second-term Bush regime would shape after clarifying the stand that in that case it would be possible to solve the nuclear issue, too. However, the administration turned down our just request and adopted it as its policy not to co-exist with the DPRK through the president's inaugural address and the state of the union address and the speech made by the secretary of State at the Congress hearing to get its approval, etc. ..//..

The DPRK has clarified its stand that it would not pursue anti-Americanism and treat the U.S. as a friendly nation if it neither slanders the political system in the DPRK nor interferes in its internal affairs. It has since made every possible effort to settle the nuclear issue and improve the bilateral relations. ..//..

KCNA 10 February 2005

3 March 2005

..//..Some forces toeing the U.S. line continue making a series of undesirable assertions that the DPRK too strongly reacted to the U.S. though it took a moderate attitude, the DPRK reneged on its international commitment and pressure should be put upon the DPRK for the resumption of the six-party talks.

The U.S. is wholly to blame for the fact that the talks have not yet been resumed and the solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. has been delayed.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry issues the memorandum to clearly explain the reason why it has decided it would go out to the talks only when there are the justification to participate in them and mature conditions for them.

1. The DPRK is left with no justification to sit at the negotiating table with the U.S. for the six-party talks or bilateral talks.

The basic key to the solution of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. is for the U.S. to make a switchover from its hostile policy toward the DPRK to a policy of peaceful co-existence with the DPRK as the issue is a product of the extremely hostile policy of the Bush administration…//..

2. It is imperative for the U.S. to rebuild the groundwork of the six-party talks and create conditions and atmosphere for their resumption as quickly as possible. ..//..

What is more serious is that the U.S. declared it would supply new type missiles capable of penetrating underground facilities in the DPRK to the U.S. forces in south Korea on a priority basis.

The July 12th, 2004, issue of the U.S. weekly Defense News, commenting on this, disclosed that the U.S. decided to deploy six Bunker Burst missiles by the end of 2005. The Bush administration has persistently conducted a psychological warfare and smear operation against the DPRK, letting loose a spate of vituperation against the dialogue partner and pulling it up over this or that issue. ..//..

The DPRK has never made any deal in the nuclear field with neither Iran nor Libya nor any other country…//..

As far as the "uranium enrichment program" is concerned, the DPRK has no such program…//..

The DPRK's principled stand to achieve the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and seek a peaceful negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue still remains unchanged.

The DPRK will go to the talks anytime if the U.S. takes a trustworthy sincere attitude and moves to provide conditions and justification for the resumption of the six-party talks.

Source: KCNA, Pyongyang, 3 March 2005

China Doubts U.S. Data on North Korean Nuclear Work

The Chinese foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, expressed doubt on Sunday about the quality of American intelligence on North Korea's nuclear program and said the United States would have to talk to North Korea one-on-one to resolve the standoff.

Mr. Li's assessment, made at an extended news conference during China's annual legislative meeting, amounted to a double slap at the United States. ..//..

President Bush last month sent a high-level envoy to Beijing to present fresh intelligence data that the Bush administration contends shows that North Korea's nuclear program is more advanced than previously thought and that it has been selling nuclear materials around the world.

One task of the envoy, Michael Green, the official handling Asian affairs at the National Security Council, was to dispel Chinese skepticism about the quality of American intelligence, administration officials and Asian diplomats said at the time.

But when asked by a Japanese journalist on Sunday to describe China's understanding of North Korea's nuclear program, including whether the country had produced nuclear fuel from enriched uranium as well as plutonium, Mr. Li answered pointedly and with a hint of sarcasm.

"Concerning whether North Korea already has nuclear weapons or anything about the question of uranium enrichment, I think that here you may know more than I do," Mr. Li said. "Or to put it another way, I definitely don't know any more than you do."

Mr. Li's comments suggest that since the Bush administration accused North Korea of violating a bilateral agreement on its nuclear arms program more than three years ago, China has come no closer to accepting Washington's contentions that North Korea already has as many as eight or nine plutonium-based nuclear bombs and is aggressively pursuing a second, less easily monitored method of producing nuclear fuel through enriching uranium.

Source: New York Times 7 March 2005

Did North Korea Cheat?

Selig S. Harrison

Two years ago, Washington accused Pyongyang of running a secret nuclear weapons program. But how much evidence was there to back up the charge? A review of the facts shows that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the data--while ignoring the one real threat North Korea actually poses…//..

Much has been written about the North Korean nuclear danger, but one crucial issue has been ignored: just how much credible evidence is there to back up Washington's uranium accusation? Although it is now widely recognized that the Bush administration misrepresented and distorted the intelligence data it used to justify the invasion of Iraq, most observers have accepted at face value the assessments the administration has used to reverse the previously established U.S. policy toward North Korea.

But what if those assessments were exaggerated and blurred the important distinction between weapons-grade uranium enrichment (which would clearly violate the 1994 Agreed Framework) and lower levels of enrichment (which were technically forbidden by the 1994 accord but are permitted by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] and do not produce uranium suitable for nuclear weapons)?

A review of the available evidence suggests that this is just what happened. ..//..

Source: Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2005

`Ultimate U.S. goal is N.K. regime change`

A complete regime change in communist North Korea is a long-term goal for the United States, the head of a top American think tank told The Korea Herald yesterday.

Edwin J. Feulner, president of the U.S.-based Heritage Foundation, said in a discussion with Herald Media publisher Hong Jung-wook that Washington will eventually work toward that goal and stressed it would be the only way for true development in the Stalinist state.

"I think it’s a desirable long-term objective and that, until fairly recently, was one of the long-term objectives of the government in South Korea too."

Source Korea Herald (Seoul) 24 February 2005

GNP Leader Requests US Envoy to NK

Rep. Park Geun-hye, chairwoman of the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP), suggested Thursday that Washington send a special envoy to Pyongyang to seek a solution to the prolonged standoff over the North Korean nuclear weapons program. ..//..

``It would be important for the U.S. and North Korea to engage in bilateral dialogue within the framework of the six-party talks,'' Park said. ..//..

She said, ``We need to set forth a detailed and realistic proposal that might touch on issues such as a security assurance for the Pyongyang government, economic support and the normalization of ties with the U.S. government.''

Source: Korea Times 18 March 2005

Teamwork Getting Shaky in Nuclear Game

The worsening ties between South Korea and Japan are threatening the ``triangular teamwork,'' which has been one of the most important strategic pillars of the United States in its uphill struggle to bring the nuclear-ambitious North Korea to its knees.

With the U.S. and the North upping the ante only outside the ring with some erratic jabs, Seoul and Washington also seem to be on sulky terms, an ominous sign ahead of the top U.S. diplomat's visit to South Korea this weekend.

Amid a rising suspicion among some Americans that Seoul appears to be moving closer to Beijing, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's Asian tour will likely be a critical moment for the U.S.' efforts to keep the three-way cooperation robust. ..//..

But some U.S. hardliners seem unable to, or just try not to, understand the delicate situations across the Pacific as they make tall orders, such as economic sanctions or surgical strikes which without doubt will trigger another war on the peninsula. ..//..

On March 10, Rep. Henry Hyde criticized Seoul for omitting the ``main enemy'' terminology from its defense white paper this year, saying it should make clear who is its friend and who is its enemy. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young rebuffed the remarks at once as an intervention in the domestic affairs by another country.

Japan's recent provocation over the Tokto islets and a history textbook reminded the people of deeply harbored patriotism, unifying not only the ideologically split people in the South but also the two Koreas, divided by heavily fortified border for more than 50 years. North Korea has joined hands with the South in offensives toward Japan.

A Seoul government official revealed his discontent at Tokyo's hard-line stance in the nuclear talks, backed by the public sentiment regarding the North's abduction issue.

Most Koreans heap scorn on the Japanese, who react to a dozen of their citizens so extravagantly, while turning a deaf ear to hundreds of thousands of Koreans that fell victim to the brutal Japanese colonialism last century.

Source: Korea Times (Seoul) 17 March 2005

Poverty Forces Over 50% of NK Defections

More than 50 percent of North Korean defectors fled their communist country due to economic difficulties, according to a survey announced by the Unification Ministry in Seoul on Sunday.

The survey of 4,075 North Koreans who entered South Korea from 2000 to June this year, showed that 2,263 defectors, or 55.5 percent, escaped their homeland because of poverty, the ministry said.

``More than half of the defectors left North Korea to avoid destitution and starvation,’’ a ministry official said. ``Political oppression is not playing as big a role as we thought.’’

Around 367 people, or 9 percent cited ``political dissatisfaction’’ as a reason for defection, the ministry said.

The survey showed that 823 defectors, or 20.2 percent, ran away from the North to join family members in the South. ..//..

Source: Korea Times 5 December 2004

Aiding North Korean defectors becomes a business

..//.. Paying a broker is a common practice among North Korean defectors in China who wish to come to South Korea.

While some religious and human rights groups are known to make travel arrangements for refugees purely on humanitarian grounds, increasingly those seeking asylum are becoming a commodity in a profitable business, with the money coming from the settlement subsidies the South Korean government pays to newly arrived defectors…//..

Brokers know defectors do not have the money to pay them in advance for their services. But the key for the middlemen is the cut they take from payments the South Korean government makes to defectors to help them resettle..//..

"The recent asylum bids are all masterminded by brokers," an official from the South Korean Embassy in Beijing said. "Brokers are involved in the defectors' decision to try and reach the South."

The business appears to be on the way to becoming a growth industry…//..

Source: JoongAng Daily, Seoul, 22 November 2004

NK Defectors Seeking to Move to US

A growing number of North Korean defectors in the South would prefer living in the United States as they believe the U.S. government would provide better working conditions and settlement programs, following the approval by U.S. Congress of the North Korean human rights bill in late September, government officials said Wednesday. ..//..

North Koreans who defected to the South are not eligible for political asylum in the U.S., but most defectors entering the country have no knowledge of the policy. This year alone, several North Koreans were repatriated to the South by the U.S. government, sources said

Source: Korea Times (Seoul) 17 November 2005