Commentary

The Joint Statement of 19 September which brought the 4^th round of Six Party Talks to an end seemed at first sight to offer a route to a resolution of the confrontation between the US and the DPRK. Hopes were soon dashed and we went from breakthrough to breakdown at rapid speed. Later talks in Beijing did nothing to move things forward and various actions over recent months by the United States have exacerbated the situation. What is happening?

Part of the explanation lies in culture. It is clear that the position of the various parties, and especially the US and the DPRK, had not shifted much during the talks. Christopher Hill had more freedom of action than his predecessor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice allowed him to engage in bilateral discussion with Kim Gye Gwan, and that was positive. The DPRK displayed some flexibility and settled, for instance, for the statement that ‘The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons’ which was a long way from earlier demands for a formal non-aggression treaty. There was even talk of Hill going to Pyongyang, and this was welcomed by the Korean side. Although these were positive signs, they were far from sufficient.

The Chinese-engineered Joint Statement was an attempt in Confucian fashion to establish a framework within which positions could be changed without loss of face and a resolution reached. In East Asia agreements, whether diplomatic or business, are seen as signalling the beginning of a relationship which proceeds to resolve differences in a flexible manner. This approach is at variance to negotiations in the Western tradition, of which the legend of the ‘hard-bargaining Yankee’ is perhaps the epitome. Here differences are identified and some sort of accommodation reached during the process of negotiation in which each side unashamedly tries to outwit the other. However, once the deal is struck then, in theory, it has to be honoured and it is legally enforceable. The relationship is fixed and the agreement specifies that is great detail. In contrast, the Joint Statement was intentionally extremely ambiguous and imprecise. That, for the Chinese, was a necessary device to keep the talks going. However, the Americans made it immediately obvious that they were unhappy with this; for them the devil was in the lack of detail.

The biggest detail that was lacking was a reference to heavy enriched uranium (HEU). It was the allegation that the DPRK had admitted to such a programme to manufacture weapons-grade uranium that allowed the Bush administration, in its own eyes at least, to tear up the Agreed Framework that the Clinton administration had negotiated. The allegation has been steadfastly denied by Pyongyang, and not substantiated by Washington, but it does remain the central plank of Bush policy. Even the issue of a light-water reactor,(LWR) the other main sticking point of the current talks, hinges on that. Without HEU the provision of a LWR as promised by the Agreed Framework cannot be denied. In fact, the Joint Statement in many ways echoed the Agreed Framework. Had Bush, or rather Dick Cheney who is the architect of US Korea policy, done a Duke of York, marching up the hill of crisis, allowing or forcing Pyongyang to reactivate its reactors and producing plutonium sufficient for a number of nuclear weapons, only to march back again? The US side very quickly made it clear that HEU was still an integral part of their agenda.

Why did the Americans sign? According to the New York Times the Chinese gave them a few hours to sign the draft and threatened that if they did not they would be publicly blamed for the failure of the talks. Rice, it is said, agreed on the understanding that they would issue a separate statement giving their ‘understanding’ of the agreement. Seoul objected on the grounds that it would ‘sour the deal’, as it did.

The New York Times article surprisingly makes no mention of Cheney, suggesting that he was temporarily out of the decision-making at the crucial time (perhaps for health reasons). He is back now and there have been a number of US actions, such as the counterfeiting allegations (again unsubstantiated), which much to the chagrin of ROK, and presumably China, have made progress at the talks less and less likely. Part of the explanation is cultural – the Yankee negotiating style – but there are deeper reasons as well which I have attempted to explore in a couple of recent articles in Asian Affairs and the NZ Journal of Asian Studies.

On a more positive note this issue of Pyongyang Reports carries details of the NZ-Korea Friendship Farm project, and how readers can contribute to this worthy effort.

Tim Beal

U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open

By JOSEPH KAHN and DAVID E. SANGER

BEIJING, Sept. 19 - After a tense weekend of heated debate within the Bush administration, the lead American negotiator with North Korea made one last call to Washington at noon on Monday, Beijing time, and then signed a statement of principles that committed North Korea, in black and white, to give up "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs."

But the negotiator, Christopher Hill, had misgivings because the vaguely worded agreement left unaddressed the date disarmament would happen, and hinted at a concession to North Korea that President Bush and his aides had long said they would never agree to: discussing at an appropriate time providing North Korea with a civilian nuclear power plant, senior administration officials said. ..//..

As described by senior Bush administration officials and Asian participants in the talks, Mr. Bush agreed to eventual discussions on providing a nuclear plant only after China turned over a draft of an agreement and told the Americans they had hours to decide whether to take it or leave it.

The North Koreans, dependent on China for food and oil, were unhappy but ready to sign. "They said, 'Here's the text, and we're not going to change it, and we suggest you don't walk away,' " said one senior American official at the center of the debate.

Several officials, who would not allow their names to be used because they did not want to publicly discuss Mr. Bush's political challenges, noted that Mr. Bush is tied down in Iraq, consumed by Hurricane Katrina, and headed into another standoff over Iran's nuclear program. The agreement, they said, provides him with a way to forestall, at least for now, a confrontation with another member of what he once famously termed "the axis of evil." ..//..

Had he decided to let the deal fall through, participants in the talks from several countries said, China was prepared to blame the United States for missing a chance to bring a diplomatic end to the confrontation…//..

In the end, participants in the discussions said, Mr. Bush decided he had little choice but to sign. He concluded several years ago that there were no acceptable military options for taking out the North's two separate nuclear programs…//..

Despite that history, the new agreement does not explicitly address the existence of a uranium program. North Korea still denies having one, despite growing evidence that it at least tried to develop bomb fuel that way with Pakistan's help…//..

As this unfolded over the weekend, the Chinese increased pressure on the United States to sign - or take responsibility for a breakdown in the talks.

"At one point they told us that we were totally isolated on this and that they would go to the press," and explain that the United States sank the accord, the senior administration official said…//..

Source: New York Times 20 September 2005

The Cabal is Alive and Well

Leon V. Sigal Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council, New York

For four years a cabal of hard-line unilateralists in the Bush administration led by Vice President Dick Cheney preferred provoking North Korea to arm rather than trying what Japan and South Korea thought might just get it to stop: diplomatic give- and-take.

The United States has paid dearly for this flawed policy: reactivation of a once frozen nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, seven or eight more bombs' worth of plutonium, added nuclear leverage for the North, growing doubts in Tokyo and Seoul about U.S. reliability and enhanced Chinese influence in the region.

Still, the cabal survives unchecked. Faced with isolation at the fourth round of six-party talks if it did not go along, the Bush administration seemed to relent by accepting an agreement in principle drafted by China under which North Korea would abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing weapons programs."

The ink was hardly dry when the hard-liners struck back, undoing the deal and hamstringing U.S. negotiators. That all but assures the next week of talks will prove fruitless, generating renewed pressure in Asian capitals for Washington to deal.

Pyongyang is not about to settle for fine words any more than Washington is. It insists on concrete signs that Washington is ending enmity as it dismantles its nuclear programs. One sure sign it seeks is the nuclear reactors Washington promised under the 1994 Agreed Framework but never delivered. ..//..

Yet, in a closing statement immediately after accepting the accord, negotiator Christopher Hill announced a decision, driven by hard-liners, to "terminate KEDO," the international consortium set up to construct the reactor. Later that day, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice implied that the "appropriate time" for discussion was when hell freezes over: "When the North Koreans have dismantled their nuclear weapons and other nuclear programs verifiably and are indeed nuclear-free ... I suppose we can discuss anything."

Pyongyang reacted sharply…//.. Even worse, having declared in the September agreement that it had "no intention" of attacking the North "with conventional or nuclear weapons" and having pledged to "respect [D.P.R.K.] sovereignty," diplomatic code words for renouncing military options and regime change, the administration backed away. Under pressure from hard-liners, Hill undercut those commitments in Congressional testimony days later by sounding the hard-liners' old refrain that "all options remain on the table." ..//..

So long as the cabal dictates policy, the administration will be better at undoing international deals than doing them, antagonizing allies and subverting U.S. security in the bargain.

Source: The Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference Washington, D.C. November 8, 2005

Gap between allies widens over N. Korea

SEOUL A long-running disagreement between the United States and South Korea over how to deal with North Korea widened publicly Thursday, when international human rights advocates gathered for a high-profile conference here and called for the overthrow of the North Korean government.

The rights conference, which Washington supports enthusiastically and Seoul has snubbed, has dramatically underscored what appears to be a worsening policy gap between the two governments, even as they proceed with six-party talks with the North.

Washington dispatched its special envoy on North Korean human rights and its ambassador to Seoul to attend the three-day forum. But the South Korean foreign minister and its human rights ambassador turned down invitations, offering instead to send a mid-level official only to a conference dinner.

The U.S. enthusiasm for the conference and South Korean coolness followed a sharp and direct exchange between officials of the two governments.

On Wednesday, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea, Alexander Vershbow, called North Korea a "very repressive" and "criminal regime" that trades in illicit drugs and runs "concentration camps for political prisoners." These charges have been repeatedly stressed recently among hawks in Washington who favor a tough, confrontational policy toward North Korea.

In an unusually quick response, South Korea, which favors a conciliatory approach to the North, articulated what amounted to a public rebuke, apparently fearing that Vershbow's comments might derail the multinational talks on ending the North Korean nuclear weapons program.

"Countries need the wisdom to control themselves when making comments on dialogue partners," Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon of South Korea said. His was one of several such comments by officials here.

Source: International Herald Tribune, 8 December 2005

Anti-avian Flu Campaign Intensified in DPRK

Pyongyang, November 18 (KCNA) -- The anti-bird flu campaign has been intensified in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The State Veterinary and Anti-epizootic Emergency Commission has recently worked out regulations of anti-avian influenza work, emergency rules of action at the bird flu outbreak and a strategy for successfully preventing it. A preventive campaign is being dynamically conducted in accordance with them. The regulations specify the working system between the central organ and local ones and make it possible to ensure cooperation and uniformity in the anti-epidemic work. And the related units shall take steps to prevent people and domestic animals from being afflicted with bird flu and take counter-measures at the outbreak of such cases according to the established system and orders.

The emergency rules of action have already been notified to the local units so as to develop the anti-avian flu campaign into a nation-wide one...//..

Meanwhile, the strategy for successfully preventing bird influenza has been established to suit the actual conditions of the country in conformity with the recommendation of the 2nd FAO/OIE Regional Meeting on Avian Influenza Control in Asia held in Vietnam and the spirit of the FAO/OIE/WHO International Meeting for Making the Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of HPAI held in Thailand. And it is now carried into practice. The ten-year long strategy reflects such projects as to train enough technical personnel and lay a material foundation to effectively cope with bird flu, transboundary zoonoses and transboundary animal diseases and, immediately, to develop the rapid diagnostic kit for HPAI, extend the immunity and validity of vaccine, check the effectiveness of vaccination and other research works.

Source: KCNA (Pyongyang) 18 November 2005

The New Zealand Friendship Farm Project

Agricultural development is one of the DPRK’s biggest needs and is an area in which New Zealand can contribute. The Haksan Cooperative Farm, on the outskirts of Pyongyang, was designated the New Zealand Friendship Farm in March 2004, on the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The farm is located in Hyongjesan district about 20 minutes drive to the northeast of Pyongyang. Located on shallow river valley land, the soils are light and sandy on the flats, rising up to slightly heavier and more fertile soils on the adjacent gently rolling hills.

In August 2005, the NZ- DPRK Society was able to send a highly experienced New Zealand agricultural scientist, Mr Peter Wilson, to assess the farm’s needs and potential.

The farm is a state cooperative which provides cheap food for the urban population in Pyongyang and a minimum subsistence to the farm workers. Built into that system is the incentive for the farm families to produce a surplus from which they can profit personally by selling in the open market. There is also an incentive for the cooperative to produce more goods which are allowed to be sold for profit in the open market. This is coming close to maximising possible production, given the farming technologies being applied. That this is occurring within in a state controlled system is rather remarkable. Some 310 hectares (ha) are planted to rice each year, 205 ha to vegetables with most of the balance being devoted to fruit trees. Around 860 families live on the cooperative. The total population is 3,010. The cooperative’s workforce numbers 1,640 persons, 40% of whom are female.

Around 45 varieties of vegetables are grown including potato, sweet potato, cabbage, onion, beans, lettuce, tomatoes, cucumber, pumpkin, radish, egg plant, carrot, peppermints, and water melon. Production is limited due to the harsh climate, but the farm managers hope that a plastic greenhouse can be built to extend production capability into the winter months. Other areas of production include pigs, rabbits, rice and fruit.

Modern and efficient reliable tractors are crucial for the farm’s development. The timing of planting can be crucial to a successful crop and the difference between a good and a bad harvest. Land preparation can be accomplished much more quickly with a tractor than by using bullocks. There are severe limitations on the amount of ploughing that can be done within a limited timeframe using bullocks because they get tired and have to be rested. The efficiency of the vegetable and rice cropping programmes has therefore fallen off with the decline in tractor ploughing. Having to keep more bullocks also creates more pressure on the land because they have to be well fed.

As a result of Mr Wilson’s visit, a number of proposals have emerged. Firstly, there is a request to supply three tractors, two for the livestock breeding work team, and one for crop ploughing. Secondly, the farm does not have a truck. Transportation is carried out by bullock cart, tractor and trailer. While it is possible to manage with these, at times operations are severely handicapped. A truck would be used for carting compost and fertiliser to the fields, bringing harvests in from the fields and transporting surplus produce to the market. Thirdly, new management technologies for rice have evolved which could result in a lift of perhaps 2 tonne per ha with no increase in costs. The System Rice Intensification (SRI) was evolved by farmers in Madagascar and, with support from Cornell University in the USA, has spread to some 85 countries. Broadly speaking these systems involve transplanting at an earlier age, planting at a wider spacing and managing the water levels in the field.

There are some other immediate practical ways New Zealanders can assist the Farm. The farm’s immediate priorities are textbooks in Korean on practical agricultural topics. A budget of $NZ1,000 would cover this. Plans are under way to buy a tractor in China where it will cost around $7,500. We hope to ship it to Pyongyang by rail. This is a priority as currently the farmers are using tractors designed in the 1930s in the former Soviet Union.

The opportunity to develop practical aid and assistance projects in the DPRK is one that New Zealand is well placed to take up. For all the difficulties in working in the DPRK, such an undertaking would make a significant contribution to a marginalised people.

Further information may be obtained from Stuart Vogel (ph +64 9 620 5595; email: s.vogel@xtra.co.nz).

Contributions to the Friendship Farm Project can be forwarded by cheque to Stuart Vogel at 74 Parau St, Mt Roskill, Auckland 1003, or directly in to the project’s account at the National Bank, Queen St Branch, Auckland, account number 100 005 060 101 0808 535 00; name of the account “NZ-DPRK Farm Project”.

Further details, including photographs, are on our NZ-DPRK page